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Abstract
The process of European integration, it is generally argued, has led to a transfer of legislative power 
not only from the national to the European level, but also, and more importantly, from parliament to 
the executive. As a consequence, democratically elected institutions at the national level are often 
bypassed in the decision-making process. The current financial and debt crisis seems to reinforce 
this trend: budgetary authority – a key prerogative of parliaments – is increasingly subject to influ-
ence from EU institutions both within and outside the EU legal framework. To assess whether and 
to what extent the crisis has indeed led to a further de-parliamentarisation, this paper will analyse 
how national parliaments have responded to the crisis. Detailed empirical data reveals a very une-
ven participation of parliaments in the management of the crisis, in terms both of formal rights 
and of their involvement in practice. As a result, the crisis reinforces the gap between stronger and 
weaker parliaments, possibly leading to the dangerous development of ‘second class’ parliaments 
in the EU. 
1 Introduction
The role of national parliaments in the EU has been 
on both the political and the academic agenda for 
quite some time now. In the past, most scholars would 
probably have replied, to a hypothetical Eurobarometer 
question, that European integration was rather ‘a 
bad thing’ for national parliaments. For many years, 
European integration appeared mainly as a threat 
to national parliaments, given that they were seen to 
be losing legislative authority to the European level. 
However, a number of studies (e.g. Auel and Benz 2005; 
Barrett 2008; O’Brennan and Raunio 2007) have shown 
that, over time, the ‘poor losers’ of integration learned 
to ‘fight back’, and obtained greater participation 
rights in domestic European policy. In addition, their 
role was increasingly recognised at the EU level: while 
national parliaments were not even mentioned in the 
early European treaties, the Maastricht Treaty and 
subsequent treaties included the first declarations and 
protocols outlining parliamentary participation rights. 
In the debates surrounding the latest treaty revision, 
the need to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the 
EU through a stronger involvement of democratically 
elected national chambers received even more attention 
(see Laeken Declaration 2000, cited in Piris 2006: 
198-206). Accordingly, the Lisbon Treaty attempted to 
strengthen the role of national parliaments, especially 
by giving them an explicit role in European politics as 
the new guardians of the subsidiarity principle through 
the Early Warning System (see below; Kiiver 2012). 
The current eurozone crisis and the resulting changes in 
the economic governance of the EU, however, threaten 
to undo many of the gains in terms of parliamentary 
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involvement: the establishment of the multi-billion 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the entry into 
force of the Fiscal Compact and the strengthening of 
the Stability and Growth Pact have an impact on the 
budgetary sovereignty of parliaments – conventionally 
seen as their key prerogative. At the same time, crisis 
management ‘by summit’ has become the norm (Schulz 
2012). The European Council has turned into a kind of 
‘emergency government’ (Lepsius 2013: 184), shifting 
the making of decisions to European executives (Eriksen 
and Fossum 2011: 158). Finally, intergovernmental 
treaties outside the EU legal framework are weakening 
parliamentary participation even further. As Benz has 
put it (Benz 2012: 2, emphasis by the authors):
Where there is no central government as in 
the EU, small circles of heads of governments 
and their close experts take the lead. This is 
indeed what we observe in the Euro crisis. The 
conclusion could be that parliaments […] at 
the national level have lost what they achieved 
during the previous decades. 
Benz himself has argued that the conclusion is too 
simplified, and that parliaments have not generally lost 
power. Rather, the problem is a growing asymmetry 
of parliamentary powers within the EU: while some 
parliaments have been marginalised in the course of 
current events, others have been able to maintain or 
even strengthen their formal participation rights in EU 
affairs. In Germany, the Bundestag was significantly 
strengthened due to decisions of the German 
Constitutional Court (for details, see Höing 2013), which 
ruled, for example, that crisis measures outside the EU 
legal framework were essentially European affairs and 
that the Bundestag had to be involved accordingly. The 
German Court also obliged the government to obtain 
the prior approval of parliament before agreeing to 
financial guarantees or to the release of bailout funds. 
The Austrian parliament was able to use the ratification 
of the Article 136 TFEU amendment1 to secure more 
extensive parliamentary co-decision rights, obliging the 
government to obtain a prior mandate from parliament 
before agreeing to decisions related to the ESM. A new 
permanent sub-committee of the budget committee 
now monitors the government’s ESM-related activities 
(Konrath 2012). As a preliminary result, a potential 
trend of de-parliamentarisation does not seem to apply 
to all parliaments to the same extent.
Against this background, the paper presents 
and elaborates on the crisis-related activities of 
parliaments. To what extent have national parliaments 
become involved in the scrutiny of the management of 
the current crisis? Do they, for instance, try to exert 
influence via their governments, or do they engage 
directly with the European Commission? Do they 
provide public debates on the management of the crisis 
and on economic policy reforms? And how can we 
explain the differences in the level of activity, with, 
for example, some parliaments passing numerous 
resolutions to influence the policy-making of their 
governments, and others initiating public debates? To 
address these questions, we draw on a quantitative data 
set of parliamentary activities in EU affairs between 
2010 and 2012 established within the OPAL2 project 
(see Auel et al. 2014). 
2 Economic Governance Reform and its 
Impact on National Parliaments
Although the crisis3 had started much earlier, it fully 
hit the EU in early 2010 when it turned into the Greek 
sovereign debt crisis. Since then, it has spread to other 
member states, most notably Ireland, Portugal, Spain 
and Cyprus, and EU member states have agreed on a 
number of economic governance reforms to manage 
and overcome what is now often labelled the ‘eurozone 
crisis’ (for an overview, see Kunstein and Wessels 2012). 
Among these reforms are the initial European Financial 
Stability Facility (the EFSF, in force since June 2010) 
and the permanent European Stability Mechanism (the 
ESM, in force since October 2012); these are both 
special purpose vehicles established to provide aid to 
eurozone member states in need of financial assistance. 
1 The amendment of Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) paved 
the way for the establishment of the ESM by the eurozone members. 
2 The Observatory of National Parliaments after Lisbon (OPAL, opal-europe.org) is a consortium bringing 
together research teams based at Sciences Po (Paris)/IHS Vienna, the University of Cologne, Cambridge 
University and Maastricht University that is funded within the Open Research Area in Europe for the 
Social Sciences by the Research Councils of Germany, France, the UK and the Netherlands (ANR-DFG-
ESRC-NWO).
3 The current crisis consists, in fact, of a number of different crises that are strongly interconnected and 
that partly reinforce each other (see for instance Overbeek 2012: 38). Brok and Langen propose distin-
guishing four crises: a financial, an economic, a sovereign debt and a political crisis (Brok & Langen 
2012: 189f.). 
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4  Both mechanisms apply only to eurozone member states.
5  Signed by all EU member states except the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom.
There are other measures, such as the so-called ‘six 
pack’ (including the ‘European Semester’) and ‘two 
pack’, aimed at reforming the Stability and Growth 
Pact and at coordinating economic governance within 
the EU more tightly to prevent future crises. The Treaty 
on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union (the TSCG, commonly 
known as the ‘Fiscal Compact’) requires member states 
to achieve a surplus or at least a balanced budget, and 
to establish constitutional or statutory mechanisms to 
limit public borrowing. Sanctions are imposed for non-
compliance. 
The crisis has had an impact on national parliaments 
in a number of ways. All parliaments – although 
to different degrees – resolved to consolidate their 
budgets. Instruments such as the European Semester 
or the Fiscal Compact thus had a great impact on 
the future fiscal and economic policy decisions of 
all the (participating) member states. What is more, 
the parliaments of those member states worst hit by 
the crisis, the debtor or programme countries, had to 
agree to so-called Memoranda of Understanding as a 
precondition for receiving financial assistance from 
international funds such as the EFSF and the ESM. 
These Memoranda of Understanding place a heavy 
burden on the countries’ citizens in terms of salary 
and pension cuts, the retrenchment of social welfare 
programmes, and a sharp increase in unemployment. In 
addition, the parliaments in these countries had already 
lost parts of their economic freedom due to their dire 
financial situation. The donor countries, in contrast, 
have had to shoulder large financial guarantees which 
may severely limit their political room for manoeuvre 
in the future.
A second development is the dramatic strengthening of 
European executives. With the EU in full crisis mode, 
the European Council has become the most important 
forum for decision-making in EMU affairs (Puetter 
2013). The governments of the eurozone have set up new 
decision-making bodies, such as the Euro Area Summit 
at which the Heads of State and Government of the 
Euro Area regularly convene prior to European Council 
sessions. The European Council, the Euro Area Summit 
and the Eurogroup have turned into a kind of European 
economic government (Wessels and Rozenberg 
2013). In fact, the financial crisis provides a perfect 
illustration of Moravcsik’s (1994) argument about the 
executive’s gatekeeper role in EU affairs: governments 
not only initiate crisis-related policies and control 
the institutional design, but they can also manipulate 
ideological justifications. ‘National governments 
defend policies agreed on at the European level and 
present national parliaments with a fait accompli. … 
This becomes particularly clear in their discourse on 
the rescuing of the Eurozone and of the single currency 
as the European common good, whereas national 
parliaments’ representation claims are thwarted as 
particularistic and parochial’ (Puntscher Riekmann and 
Wydra 2013: 570). It becomes increasingly difficult for 
a parliament not to follow what its government decided 
at a European summit.
Third, some of the measures have been implemented 
within the legal framework of the EU Treaties and thus 
apply to all member states. Other instruments, however, 
such as the EFSF, the ESM4 or the Fiscal Compact,5 
are based on intergovernmental agreements or treaties 
outside the EU legal framework. As a result, national 
governments treated (or tried to treat) the latter as 
foreign rather than EU policy, which generally limits 
the involvement of parliaments. 
So far we know little about how national parliaments 
have reacted to the challenges described above. Studies 
indicate that parliamentary participation rights, those 
regarding the ex ante and ex post scrutiny of European 
Councils/ Euro Area Summits, for example, vary 
considerably (Wessels and Rozenberg 2013). The same 
is true for new instruments such as the EFSF, where 
some parliaments have extensive oversight and veto 
rights concerning decisions at the European level, 
while others have mere information rights or are hardly 
involved in the process at all (Deutsche Bank, 2011). 
Thus, there are clear indications that the crisis has not 
simply weakened parliaments in the same way across 
member states. Rather, we have reason to assume that – 
as for EU affairs in general – national parliaments have 
reacted to the crisis in different ways. In the following, 
we present the data on crisis-related parliamentary 
activities. 
3  Dealing with the Crisis from the 
Backbenches
A broader study within the OPAL project (see Auel et al. 
2014) provides, for the first time, detailed comparative 
empirical data on parliamentary activities in EU affairs 
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between 2010 and 2012 across all 40 parliamentary 
chambers of the EU. All national parliaments in the 
EU can formulate a position on EU decisions and their 
government’s negotiation position before a decision 
is taken at the EU level. The form of these statements 
varies. While some parliaments can only issue non-
binding resolutions, others have the right to mandate 
their government, i.e. to bind it to a specific negotiating 
position. In some parliaments, issuing mandates or 
resolutions is mainly delegated to committees, while 
in others the plenary has to be involved. In addition, 
parliaments do, of course, have the option of debating 
EU issues in the plenary independently of specific 
resolutions. Finally, parliaments now also have the 
possibility of becoming directly involved in the 
decision-making process at the EU level. The Lisbon 
Treaty established a so-called ‘Early Warning System’ 
(EWS) for subsidiarity control. The system allows a 
national parliament to object to a legislative proposal on 
the grounds that it breaches the principle of subsidiarity, 
by submitting what is called a ‘reasoned opinion’ within 
eight weeks of the proposal’s publication.6 And while 
this procedure does not provide national parliaments 
with a veto, they can at least enforce a review of a 
legislative proposal at the EU level, depending on the 
number of reasoned opinions submitted.7 Since 2006, 
the Commission has also engaged in the so-called 
‘Political Dialogue’ with national parliaments. In the 
context of this dialogue, the Commission sends its 
legislative proposals and consultation papers to national 
parliaments, inviting them to express their opinion, not 
just on issues of subsidiarity, on these documents. In 
turn, the Commission promises not only to reply to all 
opinions, but also to take them into due consideration 
(Preising 2011: 152).
The data presented here takes these different 
parliamentary scrutiny instruments into account 
by including all parliamentary resolutions and/or 
mandates (depending on the scrutiny system), plenary 
debates on EU issues, and opinions issued in the 
context of the Early Warning System and the Political 
Dialogue. For the purpose of this paper, we selected 
all crisis-related activities from the larger data set8 and 
focused on lower chambers only. The final data set on 
crisis-related activities consists of 993 parliamentary 
crisis activities.
Before presenting the results, a discussion of a few 
shortcomings and caveats of our data collection is in 
order. Generally, the aim of this paper is to compare 
the activities of all lower houses in the EU. For such a 
comparison, the use of quantitative (and arguably less 
precise) data is required. As a result, the data cannot 
give a complete overview of all parliamentary activities 
related to the crisis.9 Also, simply counting activities 
tells us little about the impact of parliamentary 
involvement, i.e. whether more active parliaments also 
succeed in controlling and influencing their governments 
effectively. Since the actual impact of parliamentary 
activity in terms of influence is impossible to measure, 
we measure only what parliaments do, but not whether 
they are actually successful in what they do.
Still, as table 1a shows, national parliaments have 
certainly not ignored the eurozone crisis. Over the 
6 ‘Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality’ annexed to the 
Treaty of Lisbon. Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU), 2010 C83/206.
7 If one third of the national parliaments submit a reasoned opinion, the Commission must formally-
review the proposal and may withdraw or amend it but may also maintain it unaltered. Thus in these 
cases national parliaments can only show the Commission a ‘yellow card’, but cannot force it to take 
their concerns into account. If, however, at least half of the national parliaments submit reasoned 
opinions on a legislative proposal falling under the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision), and 
the Commission maintains the proposal, the legislative proposal will be submitted to both the Council 
and the European Parliament for review (‘orange card’).
8 This included, first, all activities on crisis-related EU legislative proposals. Second, we coded all acti-
vities relating to the intergovernmental measures initiated outside the legal EU framework including, 
for instance, the EFSF and ESM rescue mechanisms as well as the TSCG. Third, we also coded an 
activity as crisis-related if the content of the activity showed sufficient relation to the crisis. This was 
done by a qualitative assessment of the activities and included, for instance, general debates on the 
crisis or on relevant government declarations before or after European Council and Euro Area Sum-
mits, but also parliamentary resolutions dealing with the crisis outside specific EU proposals.
9 First, it covers only the use of formal parliamentary instruments, and second, it does not even cover 
all of these. For example, it does not capture the use of other parliamentary control instruments, such 
as parliamentary questions, nor does it measure the time spent on EU affairs in committees. These 
limitations are mainly due to an inability to access data.
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three years of the period under observation (2010 to 
2012), they spent almost one thousand hours debating 
crisis-related issues in over 450 plenary debates, and 
they issued hundreds of mandates or resolutions on 
this topic. The fact that these crisis activities represent 
almost one fifth (19.3%) of all EU-related activities 
further underlines the important role the crisis has 
played within national legislatures. In contrast, the 
Early Warning System has clearly been less important 
with regard to crisis legislation. Despite the fact that 
many of the measures to combat the crisis have a direct 
impact on core parliamentary competencies, national 
parliaments rarely expressed concerns about questions 
of subsidiarity. 
At the same time, the large standard deviations already 
indicate that there are great differences in the level of 
activity within different groups of parliaments (table 1b).
Table 1a: Crisis-related parliamentary activities 2010-2012 
Type of activities
Number of 
plenary debates 
Hours of plenary 
debates
Mandates/ 
resolutions
Reasoned
opinions on
subsidiarity
Political 
dialogue 
opinions
EU 27 
abs. (av.)
454 / 17 998 / 37 438 / 16 12 / 0.4 89 / 3
Standard
deviation 
(16) (39.4) (14) (1.37) (7.49)
Note: For all activities, the table provides the absolute number of all observations for 2010 to 2012, the average and the standard deviation 
(in brackets).
Table 1a: Crisis-related parliamentary activities 2010-2012 by groups of parliaments 
Type of activities
Number of 
plenary debates 
Hours of plenary 
debates
Mandates/ 
resolutions
Reasoned
opinions on
subsidiarity
Political 
dialogue 
opinions
Eurozone 
(n=17) 
abs./av. 
(stand. 
deviation) 
357 / 21
(17.8)
830 / 49.5
(43.9)
239 / 14.1
(12.6)
4 / 0.2
(0.4)
63 / 3.7
(9)
Non-euro-
zone (n=10) 
abs./av.
(stand. 
deviation)
97 / 10
(8.8)
158 / 16
(14.2)
199 / 19.9 
(15.3)
8 / 0.8
(1.4)
26 / 2.6
(3.5)
Debtors 
(n=3) 
abs./av.
(stand. 
deviation)
106 / 35.5
(31.7)
207 / 69
(64.8)
9 / 2.3
(2.2)
0 39 / 13
(17.7)
Donors 
(n=14) 
abs./av.
(stand. 
deviation)
251 / 17.9
(10.7)
633 / 45.2
(36.6)
230 / 16.4
(12.07)
4 / 0.5
(0.5)
24 / 3.4
(3.2)
Note: For all activities, the table provides the absolute number of all observations for 2010 to 2012, the average and the standard deviation 
(in brackets).
PAGE 6 .  EUROPEAN POLICY ANALYSIS 2013:19
Figure 1: Types of activity (scores)
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10 The different modes are inspired by the draft introduction to Hefftler et al. 2014.
11 The Commission responds only to those parliamentary opinions sent within the Political Dialogue 
that actually include comments or suggestions on the Commission document. As can be seen on the 
Commission’s website, this is the case for only a very small fraction of the Assembleia’s opinions 
(http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/index_en.htm). 
Eurozone parliaments, for example, have debated crisis 
issues far more often and for longer than non-eurozone 
parliaments, but they issued on average fewer mandates 
or resolutions. One reason could be that the group 
of non-eurozone parliaments contains a number of 
assemblies that can be considered as rather strong, such 
as those of Sweden, Denmark, Latvia and Lithuania. 
We also find an uneven pattern for the differences 
between debtor and donor parliaments within the 
eurozone. While debtors have debated crisis issues 
more actively, the donor countries are considerably 
more active when it comes to issuing mandates or 
resolutions. Aggregated data does, of course, obscure 
differences between parliaments within these groups. 
Figure 1 therefore presents the scores for crisis-related 
debates, mandates/resolutions and opinions for the 
individual parliaments.
As the figure demonstrates, parliaments differ not only 
with regard to their overall level of activity, but also 
with regard to what type of activity they emphasise. 
This allows us to distinguish between different modes 
of parliamentary involvement when it comes to scrutiny 
activity:10
‘Policy Shapers’ 
For some parliaments, issuing resolutions or mandates 
on EU documents or on their government’s negotiation 
position (depending on the type of scrutiny system) is 
the main activity. Greater activity in this area does not, 
of course, necessarily translate into greater influence. 
What unites this group, however, is that scrutiny 
activity is mainly delegated to committees, while, with 
a few exceptions, plenary debates take place far less 
frequently than in other parliaments.
‘Debating Arenas’
The second group consists of parliaments that focus on 
mobilising the plenary through debates. This does not 
necessarily mean that committee work is less important. 
However, in this group crisis-related issues play a 
far more important role in the plenary than in other 
parliaments, while issuing parliamentary mandates or 
resolutions is usually less important. While debates 
do, of course, also serve parliamentary oversight and 
control, especially through the opposition (Auel 2007), 
the decisive difference is that this control and oversight 
is not mainly delegated to committees.
‘Commission Watchdogs’
The third group consists of chambers that focus on 
the dialogue with the European Commission, either 
through opinions within the Political Dialogue or 
through reasoned opinions within the Early Warning 
System. 
‘Scrutiny Laggards’
Given the low overall activity of some of the 
parliaments, it is technically possible but rather moot to 
include them in any of the groups above. Even though 
parliaments in this group may spend a considerable 
amount of committee time on the scrutiny of crisis-
related issues and try to exert more informal influence, 
this does not translate into the provision of public 
debates or (visible/formal) attempts to influence either 
their government or the European Commission. 
Table 2 gives an overview of the chambers within 
each group. That membership of one group does not 
preclude membership of another is demonstrated, for 
example, by the Dutch Tweede Kamer, the German 
Bundestag and the Finnish Eduskunta, three Policy 
Shapers that also debate crisis-related issues regularly 
in the plenary. Similarly, the Italian, Romanian and 
Swedish parliaments are both Policy Shapers and 
Commission Watchdogs. Within the groups, we also 
find two clear outliers: while the Swedish Riksdag 
is by far the most active mandating parliament, the 
Portuguese Assembleia is the most active when it comes 
to sending opinions within the Political Dialogue and 
the EWS. However, in the case of the Assembleia, the 
high level of activity is somewhat misleading, as the 
parliament sent opinions on a very large number of 
Commission documents – regardless of whether it had 
critical comments and suggestions or, as was true in the 
majority of cases, simply agreed with the Commission 
proposal. Thus, it can actually also be classified as a 
Scrutiny Laggard.11 Similarly, the Estonian Riikikogu 
is just narrowly included in the group of Policy Shapers 
rather than with the Scrutiny Laggards, and the French 
Assemblée Nationale only just makes it into the group 
of Debating Arenas.
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12 Since the data only covers the 2010-2012 period, Spain is not classified as a debtor country. It received 
financial assistance for its banking sector only late in 2012. A major impact on parliamentary activities 
in these few months is not expected to be detectable with the data at hand. Financial assistance to Cyprus 
was granted in 2013.
4  Business as usual? Explaining 
Parliamentary Crisis Activities
How can the different levels and modes of parliamentary 
involvement in the EU management of the crisis be 
explained? 
A first and very basic assumption is that parliamentary 
activity in crisis-related EU affairs is simply ‘business 
as usual’, and that the level of parliamentary activity 
related to the management of the crisis is therefore not 
fundamentally different from that for other European 
affairs. Although some of the crisis measures were 
agreed outside the EU legal framework, a sizeable 
number of EU directives and regulations were related 
to the crisis and were dealt with by national parliaments 
through their usual scrutiny procedures. Second, 
parliaments already active in EU affairs have developed 
routines – for instance the involvement of specialised 
standing committees – that are likely to be used for the 
management of the crisis, and vice versa. Therefore, 
we expect high as well as low levels of parliamentary 
EU activities to be sustained within the management 
of the crisis.
H1: The scrutiny of the management of the crisis is 
essentially ‘business as usual’: The activity level for the 
management of the crisis is similar to that for general 
EU affairs.
A related assumption is that parliamentary activity will 
depend on institutional structures and opportunities, 
i.e. their capacity to become effectively involved in EU 
affairs. This capacity is generally assumed to depend on 
the institutional provisions in three dimensions: first, 
access to information; second, institutional capacity 
to process this information and, third, instruments to 
influence the government’s position in negotiations in 
the Council and to hold the government accountable 
(see also Auel et al. 2014; Winzen 2012: 659). Thus, 
we expect the level of parliamentary activity in 
crisis-related matters to depend on the institutional 
opportunities/capacity at the disposal of the parliaments 
and thus on their institutional strength. 
H2: Institutional strength: The greater the institutional 
strength of a national parliament in EU (‘crisis’) 
affairs, the greater its level of crisis-related activity. 
Finally, as already indicated by table 1b above, macro-
economic factors related to the crisis have an impact 
on parliamentary behaviour. At a very basic level, we 
expect parliaments in the eurozone to show higher levels 
of crisis-related activity since a number of measures – 
such as the EFSF or the ESM – only apply to them. Going 
a step further, it then makes a fundamental difference 
whether a country provides or receives financial 
assistance. The debtor or programme countries, Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal12 are, of course, affected by the 
crisis to a much greater degree in economic terms. Yet 
one can assume that their parliaments would actually 
have less incentive to scrutinise the EU management 
of the crisis both because of internal pressures to deal 
with their fiscal problems and, especially, because of 
external pressures emanating from the EU level to 
accept conditions for financial support and to ratify 
the EU anti-crisis measures. In turn, while most donor 
countries are less affected by the immediate economic 
impact of the crisis, they have had to make large 
financial commitments, and the main question for them 
is whether the financial guarantees will ever become 
due. Thus, rather than being forced to accept measures 
in return for financial support, the parliaments of donor 
countries have a vital interest in the effectiveness of 
the management of the crisis as a way to avoid credit 
default. Given the extent of the financial guarantees 
Table 2. Modes of parliamentary activity in crisis-related EU affairs
Mode of Activity Chambers
Policy Shapers DE, DK, EST, FI, HU, IT, LI, LV, NL, RO, SK, SL, SE, UK 
Debating Arenas* AT, DE, FI, FR, IR, LUX, MAL, NL, UK
Commission Watchdogs IT, (PO), RO, SE 
Scrutiny Laggards BE, BU, CY, CZ, GR, PL, PO, SP
* The term Debating Arenas only refers to the relative importance of debates. In fact, even in the most active Debating Arenas the 
share of overall plenary time devoted to crisis-related issues ranges from 3.75 per cent in Ireland to 8.88 per cent in Finland, and the 
share of debates on EU issues in general remains below 15 per cent.
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(and the public debates they have triggered over EU-
wide solidarity in some of the donor countries), we 
expect the incentive for donor parliaments to scrutinise 
crisis-related measures at the EU level to be greater 
than the incentive for debtor member states.
H3a: ‘Relevance’ of crisis I: Parliaments in the eurozone 
show higher levels of crisis-related parliamentary 
activity than those outside.
H3b: ‘Relevance’ of crisis II: Within the eurozone, 
parliaments of donor countries show higher levels of 
crisis-related activity than those of debtor countries. 
To test these hypotheses, we draw on the scores developed 
within the OPAL project. The OPAL score of institutional 
strength measures general par lia mentary strength in EU 
affairs.13 For the second score, we expanded the original 
OPAL score slight ly to take parliamentary participation 
rights regarding management of the new crisis into 
account. Specifically, we measured whether parliaments 
merely have infor mation rights regarding pay-outs 
through the EFSF, whether they have the right to vote on 
the pay-outs or whether they are not involved at all. The 
data is provided in an often cited study by Deutsche Bank 
in 2011.14
The OPAL score for parliamentary activity in EU 
affairs in general measures parliamentary activities 
across five different indicators (for details see Auel et 
al. 2014): number of resolutions/mandates, committee 
meetings (both number and duration of meetings), 
plenary debates (both absolute number and percentage 
of time spent on EU issues out of overall plenary time), 
European Affairs Committee (EAC) hearings with the 
head of the government as well as reasoned opinions 
within the Early Warning System and opinions within 
the Political Dialogue. To keep the scores comparable, 
we omitted committee meetings and hearings with the 
Prime Minister from the score used here, as we have no 
information on the extent to which these activities were 
crisis-related. 
As our analysis15 reveals, dealing with the crisis is 
indeed to some degree ‘business as usual’ for national 
13 Institutional strength is measured along three dimensions: access to information (access to non-public 
EU documents, access to explanatory memoranda from the government and ex ante reports on mee-
tings of the European Council and the Council of the EU), parliamentary infrastructure (type and size 
of the European Affairs Committee(s), the involvement of other standing committees in EU scrutiny 
and filter mechanisms for documents), and oversight and influence rights (the binding character of 
mandates and resolutions, the scope of the scrutiny procedure, the existence of a scrutiny reserve and 
ex post reports by the government on meetings of the European Council and/or the Council of the EU) 
(for a detailed discussion of the score see Auel et al. 2014).
14 Given that the ESM only entered into force in October 2012, EFSF participation rights are more perti-
nent for the period under investigation.
15 For this paper, we used correlations (Pearson’s r) to test the impact of the various factors. For calculations 
including the institutional strength, the sample size is 28 rather than 27, since for the Irish Dáil Éireann we 
distinguish between the periods before and after the reform of the scrutiny system in June 2011. 
Figure 2: Scrutinising the management of the crisis – business as usual?
Note: AV indicates the average for both scores, r(27) = 0.853, p < 0.001
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parliaments. As figure 2 illustrates, we found a strong 
correlation between the level of activity related to the 
crisis and the level of activity in other EU policy areas.
Figure 3 provides a comparison for debates and 
mandates/resolutions between those related to the 
crisis and those related to other EU issues. As regards 
resolutions and mandates, the crisis has, of course, been 
important for the strong Policy Shapers, such as the 
Baltic and Nordic parliaments, and also the Slovenian 
and Slovakian parliaments, but it has by no means 
dominated their scrutiny activity relative to other EU 
policy areas. In fact, we found a strong correlation 
between the number of mandates/resolutions that 
were crisis-related and the number related to other 
EU issues,16 again underlining that the crisis has been 
to some extent ‘business as usual’. The correlation is 
slightly weaker for debates, however, (r(27) = 0.565, 
p = 0.002), and the differences in the relative share of 
crisis debates are much greater, ranging from less than 
10% (Belgium) to over 80% (Ireland) of all EU debates. 
The figure also shows that the strong Policy Shapers, in 
particular, involve the plenary only rarely; EU issues 
are generally fairly firmly delegated to committees. Yet 
even in the case of some Policy Shapers the crisis has – 
despite fairly low absolute numbers – led to an increase 
in plenary debates, in, for example, Finland, Denmark, 
Estonia and Slovakia. Among the Debating Arenas 
such as the parliaments of Austria, Germany Italy, 
the Netherlands or the UK, in turn, the crisis usually 
played a large role or, as in the case of Ireland, even 
a larger role that other EU affairs. Overall, in 16 out 
of the 27 parliaments, crisis issues have been debated 
in more than 40% of all EU debates, and in 11 of the 
parliaments crisis issues were dominant, with 50% or 
more of all EU debates. 
In addition, the level of activity is closely related to the 
institutional strength of the parliaments in crisis-related 
EU affairs (figure 4). The better their institutional 
opportunities and means to get involved, the more 
active they are. But we do find that some of the most 
powerful parliaments, such as those of Lithuania, 
Estonia, Denmark or Slovenia, are less active than one 
would have expected from their strength. In turn, some 
of the institutionally weaker parliaments are more 
active than their powerful counterparts.
Similarly, the level of individual activity can best be 
explained by looking at either institutional strength 
or the general level of EU activity. Thus, whether 
parliaments are Debating Arenas, Policy Shapers or 
Commission Watchdogs also depends mainly on their 
institutional strength and their general involvement 
in EU affairs. In addition, we also found a strong 
16  (r(27) = 0.870, p < 0.001)
Figure 3: Comparing debates and mandates/resolutions 
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correlation between institutional strength in EU affairs 
in general and institutional strength regarding the 
crisis.17 Although the measurement of crisis-related 
strength is still rather crude, since it takes into account 
only specific EFSF-related rights, the finding indicates 
that, at least in this area, the stronger parliaments have 
been able to assert their powers, while the weaker ones 
remain marginalised.
Finally, we take a closer look at the impact of the crisis 
itself. As the scatterplot in figure 5 illustrates, we do 
find a relationship between eurozone membership and 
Figure 4: Comparing institutional strength and level of activity
Note: AV indicates the average for both scores, r(28) = 0.576, p = 0.001.
Figure 5: ‘Relevance’ of the management of the crisis
Note: Black diamond markers indicate eurozone member states, striped diamond markers non-eurozone member 
states and circular striped markers debtor countries.
17  (r(27) = 0.853, p < 0.001)
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the level of activity, albeit at a weak level. Apart from 
the very active Swedish Riksdag and, to a much lesser 
extent, the Danish Folketing and the Romanian Camera 
Deputaţilor, all non-eurozone parliaments (indicated 
by the striped diamond marker) remain below the 
average level of activity. Within the eurozone, however, 
differences between the donor and debtor countries 
are striking: here, the powerful parliaments of Finland, 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands form a group of the 
most active parliaments. Among the debtor countries 
(circular striped markers), by contrast, only the Irish 
parliament has been fairly active, and this is since the 
reform of its scrutiny procedures in 2011. The other 
debtor countries (Greece and Portugal), together with 
Cyprus and Spain (two member states that became 
debtors in late 2012 and early 2013, respectively), are 
amongst the least active when it comes to the crisis, 
given that the activity of the Portuguese Assembleia 
is based almost exclusively on supportive (and thus 
completely inconsequential) opinions sent to the 
Commission within the Political Dialogue. And as the 
values for institutional strength in EU affairs in general 
indicate (on the y axis), these parliaments are also 
among those that are already the weakest in the EU.
Eurozone membership also explains – at least partly 
– the mode of scrutiny within national parliaments. 
As figure 6 demonstrates, eurozone membership 
has little impact on the mandating activity, but in all 
non-eurozone members (striped markers) – with the 
exception of the UK – plenary debates concerning 
crisis-related issues play a far smaller role than they 
do in eurozone members, and this is especially the 
case for those countries where the adoption of the 
common currency is planned. This does suggest that 
the parliaments of member states that are preparing to 
enter the eurozone in the foreseeable future may have 
been somewhat less willing to debate crisis issues. 
In addition, the figure again illustrates very clearly 
the striking differences between debtor and donor 
parliaments within the eurozone. None of the 
parliaments of the debtor or programme countries of 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal (indicated by the circular 
striped markers) is very active in trying to influence its 
government by issuing resolutions on crisis issues. And 
while these parliaments do debate crisis issues more 
regularly than many of the non-eurozone parliaments, 
they remain well below average here as well. Only 
the Irish parliament is a rather active Debating Arena, 
especially since the strengthening of its scrutiny 
procedures in June 2011. Since that time, the Dáil 
Éireann has regularly debated, for example, statements 
of the Taoiseach on formal and informal European 
Council meetings as well as Eurozone Summits (see 
also Wessels and Rozenberg 2013). 
Figure 6: ‘Relevance’ of the management of the crisis for debates and mandates/resolutions
Note: Black diamond markers indicate eurozone member states, striped diamond markers non-eurozone member 
states and circular striped markers debtor countries.
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18 Personal interviews with two members of the Oireachtas, 8 October 2013
5 Discussion and Conclusions
Unsurprisingly, our data shows that there is no easy 
answer to the question raised in the introduction, 
namely whether parliaments have been active in 
scrutinising the European management of the crisis 
and the economic governance reforms, or whether 
they have been marginalised by the crisis. The level 
of activity shows that we can find both quite active 
parliaments and scrutiny laggards – and a large field in 
between. However, the assessment depends not only on 
an investigation of the level of their engagement in EU 
affairs, but also on the prior definition of what this role 
ought to consist of (Auel 2007; Raunio 2011). Clearly, if 
the ability of parliaments to control and influence their 
governments is considered to be most important, the 
Policy Shapers seem to perform especially well – always 
bearing mind the caveats regarding the actual influence 
discussed above. However, when the assessment takes 
into account the communication function of national 
parliaments, things look slightly different. In fact, we 
find few chambers that score highly on both types of 
activity. The most prominent exceptions are the Finnish 
Eduskunta, and also the German Bundestag and the 
Dutch Tweede Kamer. Finally, the Scrutiny Laggards 
may be fairly active when it comes to dealing with EU 
affairs within their committees. However, although 
they may try to fulfil their parliamentary functions in 
a more indirect and possibly in an informal manner, 
the fact that they neither try to exert influence through 
mandates/resolutions or opinions nor provide plenary 
debates means that the overall added value of this 
activity in terms of the parliamentary legitimation of 
EU politics at the domestic level remains questionable. 
A second finding is that parliaments have indeed dealt 
overall with the crisis in a roughly similar way to the way 
they deal with other EU affairs. Thus, at least regarding 
the scrutiny of the management of the crisis, to speak 
of a general ‘de-parliamentarisation’ is too simplistic. 
While the crisis did not lead to a dramatic increase in 
parliamentary mandates or resolutions, it did not shock 
parliaments into inertia. Whether parliaments actually 
had an influence on the decision-making remains – 
admittedly – an open question. As Puntscher Riekmann 
and Wydra argue for Germany, Italy and Austria, ‘despite 
highly controversial debates … majorities voted in 
favour of government’s legislative proposals’ due to their 
‘entrapment in the European rescue discourse’ (Puntscher 
Riekmann and Wydra 2013: 579). We also found that the 
crisis had an impact on the debating activity. And while 
our data does not allow us to investigate whether the crisis 
has actually led to an increase in debates compared to the 
period before 2010, findings from other studies suggest 
not only that this is indeed the case (Auel and Raunio 
2014), but also that the crisis has led to an increased 
politicisation within national parliaments (Puntscher 
Riekmann and Wydra 2013; Wendler 2012). A large 
majority of parliaments seem more willing to poke the 
famous ‘sleeping giant’ (Van der Eijk and Franklin 2004) 
when it comes to crisis issues. However, the poking must 
also not be overemphasised: on average, parliaments 
used little over 2% of their overall plenary time to debate 
crisis-related EU issues, and thus still perform fairly 
poorly when it comes to their communication function in 
this area. The Debating Arenas, all of them parliaments 
of eurozone members, perform slightly better than the 
others, but still only reach 4.2% on average. Finally, in the 
parliaments of those member states preparing to enter the 
eurozone, the crisis played the smallest role, with only an 
average of 0.5% of the overall plenary time being devoted 
to crisis issues. This could suggest that these states prefer 
to keep the giant sedated, to avoid debates where potential 
dangers and challenges related to adopting the common 
currency might be emphasised publicly.
Finally, our data confirms Benz’s (2012) argument about 
the asymmetric impact of the crisis on national parliaments: 
while the institutionally strong parliaments were able to 
assert or even strengthen their institutional position when 
it came to the management of the crisis, institutionally 
weaker parliaments remained marginalised. What is more, 
the crisis clearly hit hardest those member states with 
the institutionally weakest parliaments in the EU. While 
we do not, of course, want to draw any conclusions on 
a potential relationship between parliamentary strength 
in EU affairs and being hit by the financial crisis, we do 
note that the Irish Dáil Éireann is the only parliament that 
has increased its institutional strength. And although the 
scrutiny reform in June 2011 was not a direct reaction 
to the crisis,18 the Dáil has undoubtedly become more 
actively involved in crisis-related and other EU affairs 
since that time. All the other parliaments of crisis member 
states, including Spain (a debtor since late 2012) and 
Cyprus (a debtor since early 2013), have not (yet) been 
able to catch up institutionally with the challenges of 
either EU integration over the recent decades or the recent 
crisis. Should Slovenia decide to accept financial support, 
we will be able to observe whether this has an impact 
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on the activities of an otherwise powerful and rather 
active parliament in EU affairs. So far, the crisis has 
clearly cemented the gap between stronger and weaker 
parliaments. And the fact that the weaker parliaments 
of the debtor countries are also severely weakened by 
their financial and economic situation and by having 
to comply with external requirements and constraints, 
such as those set by the Memoranda of Understanding, 
does indeed raise the worrying spectre of a development 
towards ‘second class parliaments’ in the EU. 
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